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Abstract: The procedures used to ensure reliable occurrences of the A- 
not-B error distort and miss essential features of Piaget’s original observa- 
tions. A model that meshes a mental event, highly restricted by testing pro- 
cedures, to the dynamics of bodily movement is of limited value. To  
embody more than just perseverative reaching, the formal model must in- 
corporate Piaget’s essential features. 
All cognitive functions (e.g., perceiving, remembering, thinking  
and planning) may be subordinate to and derivative from the  
neural organization and control of movement (Sperry 1965). Thus, 
mental phenomena may be embodied in the neural dynamics of 
action. Thelen et al. have provided a formal model of a specific 
phenomenon (the A-not-B error) believed to reflect a mental  
event (a stage in the development of the object concept) that  
nicely integrates it with the domain of movement control. By crit- 
ically reviewing the studies of this error, they were able to demon- 
strate how dependent the error is on the typical processes that in- 
fluence the control of movement. Using that information, their  
model accounts for the apparent inconsistencies in the reported 
research and predicts new observations, some of which have been 
confirmed by subsequent investigation. Although I support the  
goal to embody mind, I am concerned that those procedures that 
ensure the occurrence of the A-not-B error miss or distort impor- 
tant aspects of the phenomenon. 
In the 1960s and 1970s, those who tried live demonstrations of  
the Piagetian sensorimomor stages had difficulty finding infants  
who showed the A-not-B error. However, when the error oc- 
curred, it was striking. These demonstrations closely matched the 
procedure described by Piaget (cf., Gruber & Voneche 1977, pp. 
259–60). An attractive toy would be taken from the infant and  
covered with the “A' cloth of the two cloths in front of the infant. 
If the infant retrieved the toy, it would be taken again and placed  
under the “A' cloth. On the third trial, the toy was placed under  
the second “B' cloth. The error occurred when the infant  
searched under the A cloth and not the B cloth. Once the error  
occurred, the infant’s memory for sequential events would be as- 
sessed. A toy was placed under one cloth and after the infant re- 
trieved it, the toy was placed under the same cloth; but before the 
infant could uncover it, it was removed and immediately placed  
under the second cloth. Again, the error occurred when the infant 54 BEHAVIORAL AND BRAIN SCIENCES (2001) 24:1 
 
Michel, GF. What is embodied: "A-not-B error" or delayed-response learning?  Behavioral & Brain Sciences. 2001, 24(1): 54-55. 
 
Made available courtesy of Cambridge University Press: http://journals.cambridge.org/action/displayJournal?jid=BBS 
Commentary/Thelen et al.: The dynamics of embodiment 
removed the first cloth and did not search under the second cloth. 
Piaget described these errors as “the active search for a vanished 
object but without taking account of the sequence of visible dis- 
placements” (Piaget 1954, in Gruber & Voneche 1977, p. 257). 
The A-not-B error was a convincing but elusive occurrence in de- 
velopment until several procedures were created that ensured  
that a good proportion of infants between 9- and 11-months-old 
would perform the error. However, these procedures, so well de- 
scribed in Thelen et al., transformed the task into a delayed- 
response spatial learning task with the toy as the reward. Re- 
examination of Piaget’s original account (Piaget 1954, in Gruber  
& Voneche 1977, pp. 250–72) highlights the significance of this 
transformation. 
Piaget argued that the infant conceives reality differently from  
the adult. His “experiments” were designed to identify these dif- 
ferences and to demonstrate how certain categories of mind (e.g.,  
the object concept) are neither innate nor given ready-made in ex- 
perience. Rather, these categories are constructed step-by-step  
from the infant’s actions. Actions define an object. Initia11y, the 
object concept does not include existence beyond the immediate 
engagement of infant’s actions. The infant will behave as though 
the object ceases to exist when it disappears from view. Eventu- 
ally, the infant actively searches for an object that had disappeared 
no matter what the circumstances of the disappearance. Between  
these two extremes, Piaget observed that when the object disap- 
pears in two or more distinct places, the infant does not seem to 
track, conceptually, the sequence of the disappearances. Thus, the 
A-not-B error makes its appearaince. Piaget reported that his  
daughter Jacqueline continued to search manually for a toy that  
she previously had found hidden under his hand when he placed  
the toy in plain sight but in a different place and even when she 
looked at the visible toy. To examine this error, Piaget created the 
prototypic task described above. Performance on this task to- 
gether with several anecdotes about his daughter Lucienne de- 
fined a “stage four” object concept. For example, in response to 
the question Where’s papa? (posed while in the garden), Lucienne 
turned away from her father standing in front of her and visually 
searched the window where she had frequently seen her father  
whenever she and her mother were in the garden (p. 260). 
Piaget offered three interpretations of these errors: 
1. A defect of memory – the infant, as may the adult, forgot the 
sequential displacements of the object. However, why did Jacque- 
line seek a toy where she found it last when it was in plain view  
and she looked at it several times? 
2. A defect of spatial localization – the infant’s spatial search 
strategy is first to search where the object is seen, or search where  
it was last seen, or search where the object was last found. Again,  
this interpretation fails to account for erroneous search when the 
object is in plain sight but in an unfamiliar location. 
3. A defect of objectification – the object is only a salient as- 
pect of the total context in which it is contained, including the in- 
fant’s actions and not a substantial, individualized phenomenon. 
There are “papa-at-the-window-when-in-the-garden” and “papa- 
in-front-of-oneself” or “toy-under papa’s hand and “toy on the 
table.” 
Piaget argued that the three interpretations were complemen- 
tary because “the object is not a thing which is displaced and is in- 
dependent of those displacements; it is a reality at [the infant’s] 
disposal in a certain context, itself related to a certain action [of  
the infant]” (p. 264). 
The end of this stage occurs when the child does not return to  
search a previously successful position A when the object has dis- 
appeared at position B, even when the object cannot be found 
at B. The “toy-in-plain-view” the “toy found-at-position-A,” and 
the “toy-hidden-at-position-B” have become the “same” toy. This 
compares well with Thelen et al. “there is only ‘knowledge’ of ob- 
jects embedded in the immediate circumstances and the history  
of perceiving and acting in similar circumstances.” Missing from 
Piaget’s account are multiple reinforcements of successful re- 
trieval from position A. He permitted only two such successes so   
as to avoid habit formation. Also missing is any notion of a delay 
between hiding and retrieval. Indeed, Piaget stated that “at the 
moment when the [toy] disappears in B [Jacqueline] turns to her  
left side and looks where it was before, in A” (p. 260). So, will the 
simulation show a search at A after only two successes and no de- 
lay? Will it “search” at A when the desired toy is in plain view but 
in a different location? Will it “follow” a sequence of disappear- 
ances? Will it stop searching when the toy is not found at B or will 
it return to A? Too much of what defined the infant’s performance 
as the development of the sensorimotor embodiment of a “con- 
cept” is missing from just those operational procedures needed to 
ensure that a reliable proportion of infants will make the error at  
the time of testing. Concepts may only be movement dynamics  
but the complexity of such dynamics should not be hidden by the 
constraint of the testing procedure. 
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